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An Experimental Investigation of the Patterns 
of International Trade 
By CHARLES N. NOUSSAIR, CHARLES R. PLOTT, 
AND RAYMOND G. RIEZMAN * 
This paper studies a laboratory economy with some of the prominent features of 
an international economic system. The patterns of trade and output predicted by 
the law of comparative advantage are observed evolving within the experimental 
markets. Market prices and quantities move in the direction of the competitive 
equilibrium, but the quantitative predictions of the (risk-neutral) competitive 
equilibrium are rejected. Considerable amounts of economic activity occur as 
disequilibria. Factor-price equalization is observed, but there is a universal 
tendency for factors of production to trade at prices below their marginal 
products. (JEL D50, FOO, F30) 
This study is the first attempt to create 
and study a laboratory economy with some 
of the prominent features of an interna- 
tional economic system. The purpose is to 
investigate some of the economic profes- 
sion's fundamental assumptions about the 
nature of international trade. The concept 
of multiple "countries" in which each coun- 
try has its own technology, preferences, and 
resource endowments, is introduced and op- 
erationalized. The questions posed in the 
study are related to the law of comparative 
advantage, factor-price equalization, terms 
of trade, efficiency in production, and ex- 
change as guided by multiple and interact- 
ing markets and the effects of tariffs on 
international transactions. The study builds 
on previous work in the experimental study 
of general equilibrium phenomena.' 
Because this paper carries laboratory ex- 
perimental research to a new dimension of 
complexity and into a new field, it might be 
useful to address what would be the obvious 
concern of a skeptic. Since the world's in- 
ternational economies are vastly more com- 
plicated than the economies created for this 
study, of what relevance are laboratory-gen- 
erated data? The answer is that laboratory 
experiments are not attempts to simulate 
field situations, as that question of the skep- 
tic seems to presume. Laboratory research 
deals with the general theories and the gen- 
eral principles that are supposed to apply to 
all economies, the economies found in the 
field as well as those created in a labora- 
tory. The laboratory economies are very 
simple and are special cases of the broad 
class of (often complex) economies to which 
the general theories are supposed to be of 
relevance. If a general theory does not work 
successfully to explain behavior in the sim- 
* Noussair: Department of Economics, Krannert 
School of Management, Purdue University, West 
Lafayette, IN 47907; Plott: Humanities and Social Sci- 
ences-m/c 228-77, California Institute of Technol- 
ogy, Pasadena, CA 91125; Riezman: Department of 
Economics, College of Business Administration, W210 
PBAB, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242. We 
acknowledge the financial support of the National Sci- 
ence Foundation and the Caltech Laboratory for Ex- 
perimental Economics and Political Science. The com- 
ments of Charles Holt have been useful. The com- 
ments of Mahmoud El-Gamal were especially helpful 
and resulted in the econometric model used extensively 
in the paper. 
1Jessica Goodfellow and Plott (1990) investigate the 
simultaneous determination of input and output prices. 
Peng Lian and Plott (1993), create a macroeconomy 
which includes one input and one output as well as fiat 
money and bonds. 
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ple and special cases of the laboratory, then 
it is not general. When a model is found not 
working, opportunity exists to modify the 
theory to account for the data or to reject 
the theory. Thus, the laboratory provides an 
arena in which competing notions and theo- 
ries about the nature of human (and mar- 
ket) capacities can be joined with data. 
Clearly laboratory experimental work is 
constrained by technology, and by back- 
ground experimental work. When very little 
background work exists, the experimental 
research strategy is first to explore what 
seem to be the most basic and general theo- 
retical ideas. Then, as technology permits, 
successful ideas can be challenged with in- 
creasingly complex experimental environ- 
ments in follow-up experiments. Any labo- 
ratory experiment should be viewed as only 
one of the many steps needed to learn what 
we would like to know. This study is no 
different. 
The focus of the study is the behavior of 
the entire economic system, rather than the 
behavior of individual agents. Two behav- 
ioral models, "competitive equilibrium" and 
"autarky," can be applied to the experimen- 
tal environments. Both models make precise 
predictions of the magnitude of every vari- 
able in the system, which number in the 
dozens. The existence of such a large num- 
ber of predictions creates methodological 
and expositional problems. With a large 
number of predictions, some predictions will 
almost certainly be wrong. The sheer size of 
the undertaking makes it very easy to reject 
the models statistically. Therefore, after 
making a clear statement of the negative 
result that the models are rejected, the 
analysis of the data focuses on the general 
properties of interdependent markets that 
are suggested by the models, as opposed to 
a focus on the accuracy of the specific pre- 
dictions of each model. In the context of the 
broad implications of the models, a number 
of results are stated. 
The paper is organized in the following 
manner. We begin by discussing in Section I 
the existing support found in field data for 
the basic principles we test. In Sections II 
and III, the design of the experiments is 
described. In Section IV, the theoretical 
models are discussed. In Section V, the data 
are presented and analyzed, and in Section 
VI, the conclusions are summarized. 
I. Field-Data Support for Major Principles 
The propositions that we propose to ex- 
plore are so basic to accepted theory and 
are applied so universally, that some might 
wonder why we would bother. Is it the case 
that the law of comparative advantage and 
the principle of factor-price equalization are 
well documented and not controversial? We 
think not. Nagging doubts linger because no 
direct evidence exists. Empirical results in 
support of the most basic principles of 
international-trade theory are clouded as 
they always are when the data are from field 
sources. As Michael P. Porter (1990 p. 12) 
writes, "Evidence hard to reconcile with 
factor comparative advantage is not difficult 
to find." 
In his handbook chapter on testing trade 
theories, Alan Deardorff (1984) discusses 
the general problem of testing trade theo- 
ries using field data. He cites two types of 
problems. First, simple trade models omit 
important features of the world economy, so 
model specification is an inherent problem. 
For example, the models usually assume 
only two countries, and they typically ignore 
transport costs. On the other hand, field 
data are generated by countries trading with 
many other countries in a world in which 
transportation costs exist and are often 
thought to be important. The second gen- 
eral problem is that theories tend to be 
stated in terms of variables that are not 
observable, so that testing these theories 
directly with field data is not possible. An 
example is the theory of comparative advan- 
tage. 
The theory of comparative advantage is a 
general theory which states that countries 
will export that good which has the lowest 
relative price in autarky. However, attempts 
to test and assess the theory have only been 
indirect. In principle, this theory cannot be 
tested directly with field data because con- 
ditions of autarky and thus autarky prices 
are rarely, if ever, observed. In order to 
cope with this problem, researchers have 
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developed more specific models like the 
Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin models. 
The purpose of these models is to build 
theoretical relationships from observables, 
like labor productivity or endowments, that 
can be extended to nonobservables, like au- 
tarky prices, and then to use the latter as 
the benchmarks against which trade flows 
are measured. Thus, tests of the Ricardian 
model, or the Heckscher-Ohlin model, are 
actually joint tests of comparative advantage 
and the particular specification (i.e., the Ri- 
cardian model or the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model). 
Unfortunately, these indirect tests have 
failed to distinguish between competing the- 
ories. For example, empirical tests of the 
Ricardian trade model (and the related law 
of comparative advantage) using field data 
date back to the early work of G. D. A. 
MacDougall (1951, 1952). His procedure was 
to look at U.S. and U.K. exports to third 
countries and to see whether the pattern of 
exports is explained by differences in the 
two countries' labor requirements. He found 
that the ratios of U.S. to U.K. exports and 
U.S. to U.K. labor productivity are highly 
correlated, which is consistent with the pre- 
dictions of the Ricardian model and, there- 
fore, suggests the operation of the law of 
comparative advantage. But, as observed by 
Deardorff, the tests fail to distinguish be- 
tween the Ricardian model and the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model, and as a result, the 
role and support for the law of comparative 
advantage remained unclear. 
Thus, from the beginning there has not 
been a clear test of the comparative advan- 
tage that is so fundamental to theory. Simi- 
larly, there have been relatively few studies 
testing factor-price equalization theory. Al- 
fred Tovias (1982) and Hans Gremmen 
(1985) look at the EEC countries to see if 
there is evidence that factor prices converge 
as trade becomes freer within the EEC. 
Their results are quite mixed. They find 
periods in which factor prices seem to con- 
verge, but later, as the economies become 
more integrated, factor prices do not seem 
to be converging. A later paper by 
Manouchehr Mokhtari and Farhad Rassekh 
(1989) looks at a bigger sample of countries 
and gets more positive results. They con- 
sider all of the OECD countries and use 
more sophisticated techniques. Their find- 
ings suggest that factor prices are converg- 
ing within the OECD if countries are prop- 
erly grouped into high-wage and low-wage 
countries. Furthermore, their evidence sug- 
gests that it is trade liberalization that ac- 
counts for much of this convergence. The 
evidence on factor-price equalization is far 
from conclusive. 
The experimental data do not have many 
of the problems that are associated with 
field data. The experimental data are gener- 
ated by only two countries. Transportation 
costs are under the control of the experi- 
menter. The underlying structure is known. 
Variables unavailable in the field, like au- 
tarky prices, are known in the experiment. 
Factor prices can be observed under au- 
tarky and under free trade. In the field, 
neither can be observed. The field data on 
labor, for example, involves a great deal of 
aggregation across different types of labor. 
This means that one actually compares av- 
erage wages of a group of workers in one 
country with the average wage of a different 
group in another country. If there is much 
variation across countries in groups, or if 
these groups change over time, a bias is 
introduced which may affect the results. No 
such problems exist in experiments. 
Of course, experimental data are gener- 
ated by much simpler economic environ- 
ments than those found in the field. The 
preconditions for the operations of the prin- 
ciples have been introduced by the experi- 
menters. The experiments are able to pro- 
vide some insights into how models, based 
on the basic principles, are able to organize 
the data, given that the situation is one in 
which the model can be meaningfully ap- 
plied. The experiment cannot, however, an- 
swer the equally important questions about 
the relative likelihood that nature has cre- 
ated a situation for which the parametric 
and institutional features of the model are 
relevant. 
II. Experimental Design: Parameters 
This section consists of a description of 
the market conditions within which the eco- 
nomic activity occurs. The description in- 
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TABLE 1-EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETERS 
Preferences:a 
Consumers, environment 1: 
U(Y, Z) = 600Y - 40y2 + 700Z - 40Z2 
Consumers, environment 2: 
U(Y, Z) = 600Y - 1O0y2 + 600Z - 10OZ2 
Producers, environment 2: 
U(L, K) =600L - 100L2 + 600K - lOOK2 
Franc/dollar conversion rate, experiment numbers: 
032091 112890 
030591 041091 113090 
Parameter Environment 1 Environment 2 040191 041191 041391A 041391B 011891 
Endowments: 
Consumers, country 1 L1 = 2, L2 = 0 L1 = 5, L2 = 0 1,000 800 900 800 800 
K1=3, K2=0 
Consumers, country 2 L1=O, L2= 2 L1 = 0, L2 = 3 1,000 800 900 800 800 
K1 = O, K2 = 5 
Producers, country 1 L1= 1, L2=0 L1 = 0, L2 =0 1,000 400 400 300 300 
K1=O, K2=0 
Producers, country 2 L1 = 0, L2 = 2 L1 = 0, L2 = 0 1,000 400 400 1,000 300 
K1 = O, K2 = 0 
Production: 
Countryl Y=3L, Z=L Y=L, Z=K 
Country2 Y=L, Z=2L Y=L, Z=K 
Number:b 
Consumers, country 1 4 4 
Consumers, country 2 4 4 
Producers, country 1 4 4 
Producers, country 2 4 4 
aUtility functions are in franc units. 
bThe experiments in environment 1 involved either a 16-person design or 8-person design. In the 16-person design, 
consumers and producers were all different people. In the 8-person design, each factor owner in country i was also a 
producer and a consumer of final goods in country j # i. Thus, the number of agents identified by function was 16, but 
the number of people was 8. 
cludes the environment, the parameters, and 
the form of market organization used to 
facilitate transactions. There are two envi- 
ronments: the first is motivated by the envi- 
ronment of the Ricardian Model of inter- 
national trade;2 the second is a similar 
environment, within which the robustness of 
results can be investigated and in which the 
properties of input markets can be consid- 
ered in greater detail. All markets were 
organized through the computerized multi- 
ple unit double auction (MUDA). For de- 
tails of the operation of this form of market 
organization, the reader can consult Plott 
(1991). 
Money exists in both environments. Thus, 
the first environment, although similar to 
that of the Ricardian model, differs in that 
the purchase of any good requires money. 
Money is included in the design because it 
is an obvious feature of any well-functioning 
market process, including international 
economies, and it is certainly useful in ex- 
perimental environments in facilitating 
equilibration. In both environments, there is 
2For a clear exposition of the Ricardian model see 
Richard Caves et al. (1990 Ch. 5). For a fascinating 
account of the development of the Ricardian model 
see John S. Chipman (1965). 
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TABLE 2-REDEMPTION VALUES, ALL AGENTS, Two ENVIRONMENTS, 
ONE COUNTRY (IDENTICAL COUNTRIES), ALL UNITS 
Environment 1 Environment 2 
Consumer Y Z Consumer Y Z Producer L K 
1 600 620 1 600 450 1 600 450 
520 540 250 400 250 400 
440 480 200 50 200 50 
360 400 
280 320 2 550 500 2 550 500 
200 240 300 350 300 350 
120 160 150 100 150 100 
40 80 
2 560 660 3 500 550 3 500 550 
480 580 350 300 350 300 
400 500 100 150 100 150 
320 420 4 450 600 4 450 600 
240 340 400 250 400 250 






















only one currency, and it has value as a 
commodity. All experimental currency held 
by subjects at the end of the experiment 
could be converted into dollars that the 
subject keeps as compensation for participa- 
tion in the experiment. Since the focus of 
experimentation is international trade rather 
than finance, the complicating feature of 
multiple currencies has been omitted from 
the design. 
Table 1 presents the experimental param- 
eters for both of the environments that will 
be discussed below. Continuous approxima- 
tions of the utility functions of both con- 
sumers and producers are quadratic and 
additively separable as shown in Table 1. 
The actual redemption values that were in- 
duced are contained in Table 2. Production 
technologies are linear as in Table 1. In the 
tables, valuations are given in francs (a com- 
mon name for an experimental currency). 
The francs. are converted into dollars ac- 
cording to ratios known privately to agents. 
These conversions can differ across agents 
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and are contained in Table 1. The variables 
Li and Ki refer to the factors L and K 
residing in country i and Yi and Zi refer to 
the outputs Y and Z produced in country i. 
The endowment listed in the table is the 
amount each individual agent possesses at 
the beginning of each market period. A 
country's total endowment is then four times 
the amount listed in the table, since each of 
the same type of agent has the same endow- 
ment. 
A. Environment 1 
Environment 1 is motivated by the Ricar- 
dian model. In environment 1, there are two 
output goods (final goods) called Y and Z 
and an input called L. There are two types 
of agents: consumers and producers. Con- 
sumers are owners of the factors of produc- 
tion and have induced preferences for con- 
suming the outputs Y and Z. Producers also 
have an initial endowment of the input and 
can earn profits by using the input L to 
produce and then sell Y and Z. All agents 
can also attempt to earn profits by speculat- 
ing in any input or output. Neither con- 
sumers nor producers have preferences for 
L other than its value as an input. 
Agents are divided in equal numbers into 
two countries. Each country includes as 
members equal numbers of consumers and 
producers. The factor of production is not 
mobile between countries. The final goods 
Y and Z can be traded in either country, 
not only the one in which they were pro- 
duced. The two countries differ only in their 
production technologies. 
The economy works in the following way. 
Consumers sell their endowment of L to 
producers in their own country and then 
buy units of Y and Z produced in either 
country. Consumers get utility (U.S. dollars) 
from consumption and any profits made in 
price speculation. Producers in each coun- 
try buy L from the consumers in their own 
country and can use L to produce Y and Z 
which they can sell to consumers in either 
country. Producers get utility (dollars) from 
profits earned from market and production 
activities. 
In some experiments, free international 
trade was permitted; in others a tariff was 
imposed on the imports of Z to country 1. 
When a tariff was in effect, it took the form 
of a tax of 400 francs on international trans- 
actions of the final goods. The tariff revenue 
was not redistributed to citizens in either 
country but instead was taken by the experi- 
menter. Thus, the tariff operated similarly 
to a transportation cost. 
B. Environment 2 
In environment 2, the two countries have 
different endowments of the inputs. In ad- 
dition, the inputs are endogenously and 
elastically supplied to producers in the 
sense that resources could also be con- 
sumed. Environment 2 operated as a con- 
trol on environment 1 to ensure that any 
properties of input markets observed in en- 
vironment 1 were not simply due to the 
completely inelastic supply of the input. The 
endogenous-resource property of environ- 
ment 2 is a natural feature to add as a 
check on robustness of a model's ability to 
capture observed behavior because it is a 
general property of the field economies in 
which the competitive and autarky models 
are regularly applied. 
In environment 2 there are two output 
goods called Y and Z and two inputs called 
L and K. There are also two types of agents: 
consumers and producers. As in environ- 
ment 1, consumers are also owners of the 
factors of production. Consumers are en- 
dowed with some of both of the inputs L 
and K. Consumers have induced prefer- 
ences for consuming the outputs Y and Z. 
Producers of the final goods are also con- 
sumers of the factors of production. They 
have no initial endowment but have prefer- 
ences induced for consuming the inputs L 
and K and also for the money they might 
get by producing Y from L and Z from K 
and selling the output. 
Participants are divided equally into two 
countries. Each country has an equal num- 
ber of consumers and producers. Both types 
of agents can trade the inputs L and K only 
with agents in their own country. The final 
goods Y and Z can be traded internation- 
ally. No tariffs existed in any of the experi- 
ments in which environment 2 was imple- 
mented. 
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TABLE 3-SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTS 
Experiment Number of 
number (date) Tariffs Y/N Periods Environment Subject pool subjects 
030591 N 11 1 Caltech 8 
040191 N 10 1 Caltech 8 
041191 N 9 1 U. Iowa 16 
041391A N 10 1 U. Iowa (exper.)a 16 
032091 Y 10 1 Caltech 8 
041091 Y 9 1 U. Iowa 16 
041391B Y 10 1 U. Iowa (exper.)a 8 
112890 N 9 2 Caltech 16 
113090 N 11 2 Caltech 16 
011891 N 10 2 Caltech 16 
aSubjects had experience in one of the earlier experiments listed here. 
Consumers sell their endowment of in- 
puts to producers in their own country, and 
consumers buy units of Y and Z produced 
in either country. Producers can buy L and 
K from consumers in their own country. 
Producers can consume any part of the pur- 
chases of L and K and can use the remain- 
der to produce Y and Z, which they can 
then sell in either country. 
III. Experimental Design: Procedures 
A total of ten experiments were con- 
ducted. Table 3 provides a summary of 
treatments. Experiments are indexed by the 
date of the experiment. Two subject pools 
were used. The experiments involved either 
8 people or 16 people. The use of 8 people 
for some experiments was dictated by cost 
and difficulties in recruiting subjects. 
In the conditions of environments 1 and 
2, there were six and eight markets, respec- 
tively, operating simultaneously.3 Each vari- 
able had its own market (e.g., output Yi, Y 
produced in country i, had its own market). 
The production process allowed subjects to 
transfer units from and to inventories of 
certain markets in fixed ratios. Production 
was accomplished through a series of 
keystrokes. To consume units, subjects held 
them in their inventory at the end of a 
market period. 
Subjects, undergraduates at the Califor- 
nia Institute of Technology and at the Uni- 
versity of Iowa, had at least one half hour of 
prior training in use of MUDA.4 The 
MUDA software is accompanied by a tuto- 
rial that explains the key functions to sub- 
jects and lets subjects practice using the 
keys in an environment containing randomly 
behaving robots. The Appendix contains in- 
structions read to subjects. During period 0 
and period 1, accounting records were 
checked carefully for mistakes, and spot 
checks were conducted in later periods. 
The experiment was divided into trading 
periods or trading "days." At the beginning 
of each, subjects received new endowments 
and redemption values which were the same 
each period. At the beginning of the experi- 
ment there was a long practice period 
(period 0) for 15 minutes in which no money 
was paid. Market periods averaged 10 min- 
utes in length. 
3The names L and K were not used to label the 
markets in any experiments because they might suggest 
behavior to the subjects if they thought that L and K 
represented labor and capital. The labels used in mar- 
kets are explained in the Appendix. 
Although Caltech subjects were only allowed to 
participate in one experiment in this particular line of 
experimentation, some of the Caltech subjects had 
been in other market experiments. None of the Univer- 
sity of Iowa subjects had been in other market experi- 
ments previously, although experiments 041391A and 
041391B used only subjects who had been in one of the 
previous experiments in the series. 
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IV. Models 
The models described below rely on 
strong assumptions. The complex environ- 
ments of the experimental markets are much 
richer than those that the models describe. 
However, experimental economics has 
demonstrated that models frequently have 
surprising power even when applied to envi- 
ronments much more complex than the 
structure of the models. The questions that 
will ultimately be posed concern the identi- 
fication of models that can provide intuition 
needed for help with the interpretation of 
market data. 
A. The Competitive Model 
This section contains a brief elaboration 
and review of the competitive model. The 
computation and description of the compet- 
itive equilibria for both environments are in 
a technical appendix which is available from 
the authors upon request. Recall that the 
first environment has two outputs, both of 
which can be produced with the same input, 
paralleling that of the Ricardian model of 
international trade. In the Ricardian envi- 
ronment there are two final goods, Y and Z, 
each of which is produced using one factor, 
L. There are two countries which may differ 
in their endowments of the factor. The fac- 
tor cannot cross national boundaries and is 
supplied inelastically to the markets. The 
two countries are assumed to have different 
production functions so that each country 
has a comparative advantage in production 
of one of the goods. Without loss of gener- 
ality, call the country with a comparative 
advantage in the production of Y country 1. 
The two countries have identical aggregate 
demand for both goods. In autarky, the 
price ratio Pz/Py should be greater in 
country 1 than in country 2. That is, country 
1 can produce good Y more cheaply in 
terms of good Z then can country 2. If trade 
between the two countries is permitted, then 
comparative advantage dictates that country 
1 specializes in and exports good Y. Simi- 
larly, country 2 specializes in and exports 
good Z. If the final goods are traded with- 
out restrictions, the prices of the final goods, 
Y and Z, will be the same across countries 
and the price of L generally will be different 
in each country. 
Thus, for environment 1, the competitive 
model predicts that countries 1 and 2 would 
produce exclusively goods Y and Z, respec- 
tively, and that each of the two countries 
would be a net exporter of the output which 
it produces. In particular country 1 would 
produce only Y, and country 2 would pro- 
duce only Z. The prices of the outputs would 
be equal in each country according to the 
model, and the prices of inputs would equal 
their marginal revenue products. 
If a tariff were imposed on the country-1 
imports of Z in environment 1, then accord- 
ing to the competitive model international 
trade of Z would decline. The price of Z in 
country 1 would increase, and the price of Z 
in country 2 would fall. The input price in 
country 2 would also decline, since its 
marginal revenue product would be lower. 
The tariff imposed was 400 francs. 
In environment 2, the competitive model 
predicts that each country would produce 
both output goods. Country 1, however, 
would be a net exporter of Y, and country 2 
would be a net exporter of Z. Under condi- 
tions of free trade, the prices of outputs 
would be equal across countries. Since de- 
rived demand would be identical in both 
countries, then the factor prices would also 
be the same and would equal the factors' 
marginal revenue product. The price of each 
of the four types of goods in country 1 
would equal its price in country 2. The 
prediction of the equality of input prices 
across countries in environment 2 will be 
referred to as the factor-price equalization 
principle. Notice that for the parameter val- 
ues imposed in this environment, factor- 
price equalization is predicted even though 
the factors cannot be traded internationally. 
B. Autarky 
A natural alternative model to use is the 
autarky model. It is useful because it char- 
acterizes one benchmark of the potential 
behavior which a system might exhibit. Its 
predictions are based upon the proposition 
that no trade will occur across national 
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TABLE 4-SPECIFIC PREDICTIONS OF THE Two MODELS: PRODUCTION AND EXPORT QUANTITIES AND PRICES 
IN FRANCS WITH AND WITHOUT TARIFFS 
Environment 1 
Competitive Autarky Environment 2 
With No With No 
Variable tariff tariff tariff tariff Competitive Autarky 
Production: 
Y, 36 36 21 21 12 10 
Y2 0 0 5 5 4 6 
Z, 0 0 5 5 4 6 
Z2 32 32 22 22 12 10 
Exports: 
Y, 18 18 0 0 4 0 
Y2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Net Y (from 1 to 2) 18 18 0 0 4 0 
Z1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Z2 16 6 0 0 4 0 
Net Z(from 2 to l) 16 6 0 0 4 0 
Prices: 
L, 720 720 600 600 200-250 150 
L2 760 360 520 520 200-250 300-350 
K1 200-250 300-350 
K2 200-250 150 
Y, 240 240 200 200 200-225 150 
Y2 520 520 200-225 300-350 
Z1 600 600 200-225 300-350 
Z2 380 180 260 260 200-225 150 
boundaries. This model predicts the prices 
and production levels in each country which 
would occur in a competitive equilibrium 
with no international transactions permit- 
ted. This model thus offers specific predic- 
tions of prices, patterns of production, in- 
ternational trade, and the effects of tariffs. 
For environment 1, the autarky model 
predicts that specialization would not occur 
in either country, and that there would be 
no international trade or payment imbal- 
ances. Since there is no trade across na- 
tional boundaries, the predictions of this 
model are unaffected by the imposition of 
tariffs. According to the autarky model, 
prices of all goods would be different in the 
two countries. 
The autarky model also makes predic- 
tions concerning production and trade in 
the two countries in environment 2. Both 
countries produce both goods but in differ- 
ent quantities than in the competitive equi- 
librium. Autarky predicts that there will be 
no international trade and that both input 
and output prices will be different across 
countries. The wage-price ratio predictions 
are identical to those predicted by the com- 
petitive model. There should be no payment 
imbalances. The predictions of the autarky 
model are computed in a similar way to the 
competitive model. The computations are 
available from the authors upon request. 
The specific predictions of the two mod- 
els in the two environments are given in 
Table 4. An illustration of the autarky model 
and the competitive model is given in 
Figure 1 from an individual's point of view 
for environment 1. In the figure, if trade 
between countries does not occur, an indi- 
vidual in country 1 achieves his highest in- 
difference curve given initial endowments, 
by consuming 5.25 units of Y and 1.25 units 
of Z. Similarly, an individual in country 2 
reaches his highest possible utility level by 
consuming 1.25 units of Y and 5.5 units of 
Z. In the experimental environment, money, 
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which has value to all agents, may be bor- 
rowed costlessly in large quantities from the 
experimenter. For this reason, there is no 
budget constraint. The optimal consump- 
tion bundle is determined by the prices of Y 
and Z and by the consumer's utility for Y, 
Z, and money. The autarky consumption 
bundles of individual consumers in the two 
countries are labeled with A's in the figure. 
If free trade occurs, then each country can 
achieve a higher utility level by specializing 
in the commodity in which it has a compara- 
tive advantage and then trading internation- 
ally at the world competitive equilibrium 
price. The competitive-equilibrium individ- 
ual consumption bundles are labelled with 
C's. In the competitive equilibrium, each 
country consumes 18 units of Y and 16 units 
of Z. 
C. Efficiency 
The efficiency measurements in our ex- 
periments were first developed by Plott and 
Smith (1978). In a single market the system 
is operating at 100-percent efficiency if the 
total profit that all subjects make in an 
experiment is at a maximum. It is similar to 
maximizing consumer plus producer sur- 
plus. 
In a general-equilibrium system the prob- 
lem becomes a little tricky. Because of the 
single currency in these experiments, the 
gains from exchange are exhausted at the 
maximum of system profits in terms of 
the experimental currency, francs. Actual 
profits divided by the maximum possible 
becomes the measure of system efficiency. 
Efficiency is 100 percent if the competitive 
equilibrium is attained. When tariffs were 
imposed, the government revenues were 
treated the same as were the profits of 
individuals and, therefore, included as part 
of the "consumer surplus" that was created 
by exchange. 
V. Results 
The principal observations are summa- 
rized in Results 1-9. A typical price time 
series from environment 1 (no tariffs) is 
represented in Figures 2 and 3. The vertical 



















FIGURE 1. CONTINUOUS APPROXIMATION OF 
REPRESENTATIVE CONSUMER'S INDIFFERENCE 
CURVE AND RELATIVE PRICES UNDER AUTARKY 
AND FREE TRADE 
axis measures price in terms of the currency 
of the experiment. The horizontal axis mea- 
sures time in seconds. All markets were 
organized electronically with the bids, asks, 
and contracts made via computerized inter- 
actions. Thus market activity took place in 
real (clock) time, and the data are recorded 
in terms of the second at which actions took 
place. Thus, "Clock (sec)" on the horizontal 
axis means the exact second that the action 
took place. Vertical lines represent the be- 
ginning or the end of periods or "days" as 
described in Section III. Thus, the interval 
between the end of one period and the 
beginning of the next appears as an empty 
vertical band representing seconds in which 
nothing happened in the markets because 
the markets were closed while subjects did 
their accounting. Contract prices are repre- 
sented as circles and are connected by lines 
so that the time sequence can be more 
easily identified. The input prices for each 
country separately are shown in Figure 2. 
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FIGURE 2. INPUT-PRICE TIME SERIES, EXPERIMENT 041391A: COUNTRY 1 (UPPER GRAPH) AND 
COUNTRY 2 (LOWER GRAPH) 
The output prices are pooled across coun- 
tries for each of the two outputs and are 
given in the two graphs of Figure 3. Hori- 
zontal solid lines are drawn at the level of 
the theoretical competitive prices and also 
the autarky prices as marked. 
Several useful impressions can be drawn 
from the figures. First, the data are not 
automatically clustered at the competitive 
equilibria. This is perhaps no surprise to 
those who have studied the properties of 
experimental markets, but the fact that 
markets are not always automatically at the 
competitive equilibrium is of substantial im- 
portance to those who must use equilibrium 
theories as a specification tool in the inter- 
pretation of field data. Secondly, the prices 
over time move toward the competitive 
equilibria. This power of the competitive- 
equilibrium model in predicting the direc- 
tion of the movement in these complicated 
markets is also observed in simpler eco- 
nomic environments. The formal statements 
of results in this section will make these 
general impressions precise. 
The analysis of the data of this section 
encounters some classical problems that ex- 
ist in the analysis of almost all data pro- 
duced in experimental markets. Markets ex- 
hibit a convergence process that is not 
understood theoretically. From a practical 
point of view, this means that serial cor- 
relation is present, and heteroscedasticity 
may be present. In the absence of a well- 
developed theory of a convergence process, 
such statistical complications create sub- 
stantial problems with any attempt to sum- 
marize succinctly the patterns that may exist 
in the data. With these qualifications in 
mind, the following model, motivated by the 
model of Orley Ashenfelter et al. (1992), is 
used repeatedly to analyze the effect of time 
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FIGURE 3. OUTPUT-PRICE TIME SERIES, EXPERIMENT 041391A: PRICES OF Y IN BOTH COUNTRIES 
(UPPER GRAPH) AND PRICES OF Z IN BOTH COUNTRIES (LOWER GRAPH) 
on the outcome variables in the experi- 
ments:5 
(1) yit = B11Dj(1/t) + B12D2(1/t) 
+ * * * + BiA D1( 1/t ) + 
+BlnDn(llt) +B2( t-l)/t+u 
where i indicates the particular experiment, 
t represents time as measured by the num- 
ber of market periods in the experiment, Di 
is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 
for i and a value of 0 otherwise, and Bli is 
the origin of a possible convergence pro- 
cess. Notice that if t = 1 then the value of 
the dependent variable is equal to Bli for 
experiment i. B2 is the asymptote of the 
dependent variable. As t gets large the 
5We benefited from several discussions with Mah- 
moud El-Gamal who suggested the specification that 
we used, along with others. The estimates in the tables 
are corrected for first-order autocorrelation, which is 
present within the experimental sessions. In addition to 
the estimates of the equations given in the text, two 
alternative specifications were also used to analyze the 
data. They were 
1 1 t 
z = B11D1- + + BlkDk- + B21D1 () t t 
+ + B2kDk ( t + u 
and 
1a, ak 
z= B11D,t + **+ BlkDk(|) 
+ B2 + u 2 t 
where z is any of the dependent variables, such as 
quantity produced, quantity exported, or price of a 
commodity. Refer to the last two equations as specifi- 
cations 1 and 2, respectively. Specification 1 assumes a 
linear functional form but allows the time series to 
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TABLE 5-CONVERGENCE PATTERNS OVER TIME OF PRODUCrION, EXPORTS, AND MARKET PRICES, 
ENVIRONMENT 1 (No TARIFF) 
1 1 t-1 
y=B11D1-+ +B14D4- +B2 ? +u 
t t I 
Competitive equilibria Autarky 
Dependent Model Model 
variable BI1 B12 B13 B14 B2 predictions Significance (p) predictions Significance (p) p R2 
Production: 
Y, 17.73 21.56 13.44 28.15 32.70 36 < 0.005 21 < 0.005 0.13 0.69 
(3.32) (1.32) (2.10) (1.86) (0.70) 
Y2 4.81 6.92 2.68 3.29 0.68 0 ns 5 < 0.005 0.45 0.71 
(0.85) (1.11) (1.16) (0.42) (0.47) 
Z, 4.81 4.90 7.73 2.28 0.87 0 < 0.005 5 < 0.005 0.02 0.66 
(0.92) (0.32) (0.70) (1.00) (0.18) 
Z2 18.73 18.10 26.84 25.42 30.93 32 ns 22 < 0.005 0.48 0.76 
(1.20) (2.28) (2.50) (0.87) (1.04) 
Net exports: 
Y 1.93 5.88 11.78 14.16 14.35 18 ns 0 < 0.005 0.58 0.73 
(2.62) (2.05) (2.47) (2.80) (2.14) 
Z 5.32 9.08 15.72 12.48 16.06 16 ns 0 < 0.005 0.49 0.62 
(2.78) (1.47) (4.47) (1.77) (1.61) 
Market prices: 
PLI 429.7 501.7 600.1 420.6 700.9 720 ns 600 < 0.05 0.42 0.48 
(79.3) (66.0) (231.1) (43.0) (49.8) 
PL2 415.1 300.9 580.6 501.3 601.9 760 < 0.005 520 < 0.05 0.59 0.69 
(91.0) (65.1) (48.6) (47.0) (44.7) 
Py, 405.4 279.3 812.6 439.7 295.9 240 < 0.005 200 < 0.005 0.33 0.89 
(29.6) (40.1) (59.0) (25.8) (12.8) 
PZ2 439.6 484.6 745.7 426.8 439.6 380 < 0.005 260 < 0.005 0.34 0.77 
(26.9) (28.8) (76.9) (33.6) (14.6) 
Note: Estimates were corrected for AR(1). 
weight of Bil is small because 1/t ap- 
proaches zero while the weight of B2 is 
large because (t-1)/t approaches 1. No- 
tice that B2 is common to all experiments. 
Finally, u is the random error term that is 
distributed normally with mean zero. We 
allow for heteroscedasticity and first-order 
autocorrelation. 
The model is equipped to answer ques- 
tions about the direction of convergence. 
Each experiment might have a different 
starting point, but according to the intuition 
of competitive-market theory, the processes 
should converge, and the ultimate point of 
convergence should be the same (the com- 
petitive equilibrium quantities). For pur- 
poses of describing the data, the term "weak 
convergence" is used when the start of the 
data, as measured by B1i, is further from 
the predictions of the model than is the 
asymptote, as measured by B2. 
The model was estimated for each of the 
relevant dependent variables, and the re- 
sults of the estimates are contained in Ta- 
bles 5, 6, and 7. The standard errors are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity using 
White's method (see Halbert White, 1980), 
as well as first-order autocorrelation. The 
model was estimated for each of the treat- 
converge to a different value for each experimental 
session. Specification 2 is nonlinear; we estimate the B, 
a, and y terms. The functional form was based on an 
ex post inspection of the data. It allows the time series 
to converge at different rates in the different experi- 
mental sessions but requires all of the data to converge 
to a common asymptote. The estimates of the alterna- 
tive specifications are not given here, because they do 
not improve upon the specification used in the text. 
Specification 1 yields adjusted R2's, estimated coeffi- 
cients, and standard errors close to those of the speci- 
fication given in the text. The nonlinear specification 2 
also yields comparable adjusted R2's but very large 
standard errors, especially for the price variables, so 
that usually neither the competitive model nor the 
autarky model could be rejected. 
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TABLE 6-CONVERGENCE PATTERNS OVER TIME OF PRODUCTION, EXPORTS, AND MARKET PRICES, 
ENVIRONMENT 1 (WITH TARIFFS) 
1 1 t-1 
y = B11D1 -+ + B13D3-+ B2- + u 
t t 
Competitive equilibria Autarky 
Dependent Model Model 
variable BI1 B12 B13 B2 predictions Significance (p) predictions Significance (p) p R2 
Production: 
Y, 27.17 32.33 14.42 27.97 36 ns 21 ns 0.61 0.62 
(3.37) (4.67) (5.48) (5.45) 
Y2 2.13 9.14 9.56 3.96 0 < 0.005 5 ns 0.40 0.63 
(1.41) (0.93) (2.23) (0.87) 
Z, 3.06 1.26 7.03 2.57 0 ns 5 ns 0.64 0.66 
(1.22) (1.74) (1.67) (1.82) 
Z2 25.60 5.56 11.79 24.51 32 < 0.01 22 ns 0.56 0.77 
(1.94) (1.99) (4.31) (2.70) 
Net exports: 
Y 7.16 14.05 -1.77 13.06 18 ns 0 < 0.005 0.52 0.57 
(1.82) (5.11) (3.41) (3.28) 
Z 1.23 1.85 0.72 1.42 6 < 0.005 0 ns 0.43 0.31 
(1.03) (1.57) (0.75) (1.20) 
Market prices: 
PL1 500.8 391.5 413.7 677.5 720 ns 600 ns 0.51 0.42 
(56.9) (130.5) (68.1) (75.6) 
PL2 268.4 247.0 -24.3 473.3 360 ns 520 ns 0.88 0.68 
(646.5) (959.9) (938.2) (964.5) 
PY, 297.9 1,002.9 434.0 289.2 240 < 0.01 200 < 0.005 0.22 0.84 
(37.0) (103.5) (48.4) (18.7) 
Pz2 166.4 1,003.0 606.5 283.6 180 < 0.005 260 ns 0.00 0.73 
(38.1) (140.6) (95.7) (21.7) 
ment environments and for each of the vari- 
ables, separately. The significance levels 
for various hypothesis tests are also in the 
tables. 
Notice from Figures 2 and 3, that the 
transaction prices seem to be moving to- 
ward the competitive-equilibrium prices 
over time. While this tendency of conver- 
gence will ultimately be shown to be true, 
the first pass at the data holds to strict 
standards. As can be seen the prices are not 
at the competitive equilibrium. As we indi- 
cated earlier, in economic systems as com- 
plicated as these, it is very easy to statis- 
tically reject the benchmark models. This 
indeed proved true. 
The first result is important because it 
shapes the entire discussion. It demon- 
strates that neither the competitive model 
nor the autarky model accurately represents 
the data generated by the experiments. Such 
a result is not particularly surprising to those 
who have studied the behavior of experi- 
mental markets. The market prices and 
quantities traded, as predicted by the com- 
petitive model, are often rejected, and the 
autarky model is usually rejected as well. 
The models are static, while the actual mar- 
kets exhibit considerable dynamic and ad- 
justment behavior, the very existence of 
which is sufficient to reject the models. 
However, Result 1 is especially interesting 
because of the power brought to the analy- 
sis by the econometric model introduced 
above. The result says that, even after the 
model has been modified to incorporate 
differential adjustment rates in different ex- 
perimental sessions, both models can still be 
rejected. 
RESULT 1: Both the competitive model and 
the autarky model can be rejected as accurate 
representations of the data. 
SUPPORT: 
Rejection of the models rests on the fact 
that each of the models makes numerous 
predictions. Of course, rejection only re- 
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TABLE 7-CONVERGENCE PATTERNS OVER TIME OF PRODUCTION, EXPORTS, AND MARKET PRICES, ENVIRONMENT 2 
1 1 t-1 
y = B11D1- + +B13D3- +B2 +u 
t t 
Competitive equilibria Autarky 
Dependent Model Model 
variable B11 B12 B13 B2 predictions Significance (p) predictions Significance (p) p R2 
Production: 
Y, 6.69 7.79 7.68 11.53 12 ns 10 < 0.05 0.29 0.41 
(1.86) (0.66) (0.86) (0.72) 
Y2 5.74 7.58 3.11 4.72 4 < 0.05 6 < 0.005 0.13 0.25 
(1.87) (0.84) (0.93) (0.39) 
Z, 6.23 4.20 4.78 6.15 4 < 0.005 6 ns 0.09 0.06 
(0.83) (1.82) (1.54) (0.51) 
Z2 6.44 11.76 5.06 10.50 12 < 0.05 10 ns 0.16 0.27 
(0.92) (2.04) (2.96) (0.64) 
Net exports: 
Y -2.68 0.14 4.96 3.72 4 ns 0 < 0.005 0.12 0.48 
(1.16) (1.42) (1.70) (0.49) 
Z 0.68 3.80 2.65 4.16 4 ns 0 < 0.005 0.30 0.19 
(1.89) (1.68) (2.45) (1.11) 
Market prices: 
PLI 408.6 187.8 388.8 227.4 200-250 ns 150 < 0.005 0.12 0.89 
(16.9) (8.5) (15.7) (5.6) 
PL2 390.9 307.9 514.4 220.8 200-250 ns 300-350 < 0.005 0.35 0.62 
(12.7) (35.6) (82.3) (15.1) 
PK, 327.1 227.2 260.2 233.5 200-250 ns 300-350 < 0.005 0.37 0.58 
(44.6) (7.2) (34.5) (1 1.0) 
PK2 349.4 301.7 281.8 220.0) 200-250 ns 150 < 0.005 0.27 0.47 
(23.8) (28.0) (49.2) (9.9) 
Py, 583.9 322.9 497.7 256.7 200-225 < 0.005 150 < 0.005 0.37 0.92 
(15.0) (23.2) (32.9) (10.5) 
P Y2 525.2 382.9 534.5 255.6 200-225 < 0.005 300-350 < 0.005 0.31 0.87 
(18.9) (34.9) (17.8) (10.0) 
Pzl 528.6 342.0 475.5 257.0 200-225 < 0.005 300-350 < 0.005 0.24 0.24 
(40.9) (17.0) (18.5) (8.2) 
Pz2 448.3 377.0 331.5 276.7 200-225 < 0.005 150 < 0.005 0.00 0.71 
(13.2) (18.6) (16.8) (5.3) 
quires that one prediction be wrong, but we 
reject the model's predictions of many of 
the outcome variables. Testing of the mod- 
els is focused only on the variable B2, which 
represents the long-term (asymptotic) ten- 
dency of the magnitude of the variables. 
The estimates are in Tables 5, 6, and 7 for 
each of the treatment conditions, environ- 
ment 1 with and without tariffs, and envi- 
ronment 2. A summary of significance tests 
of the two models and variables is provided 
in each of the tables. As can be seen in 
Table 5, the autarky model is rejected for 
every variable in environment 1 (no tariff) at 
the p < 0.005 level of significance for eight 
of the ten variables and at the p < 0.05 level 
for the other two variables. As shown in 
Table 7, all price predictions of the autarky 
model are incorrect in environment 2, as 
are its predictions of exports and of produc- 
tion of Y in both countries. The autarky 
model performs best under environment 1 
(tariff), as shown in Table 6, but even in this 
case, two of the variables are significantly 
different from the predictions of the model 
at the 0.005 level of significance. 
Under the conditions of environment 1 
(no tariff) the competitive model fails to 
predict two of the four production variables, 
the prices of L2, Y, and Z. Under the 
conditions of environment 1 (tariff), the 
competitive model fails to predict three of 
the six aggregate production and export lev- 
els, as well as the prices in two of the four 
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markets. In all cases, the significance level 
supporting rejection is at least 0.05. As for 
environment 2, the competitive model is 
rejected for seven of the 14 variables at the 
0.05 level of significance. 
It is important to note, as is clear from 
the tables, that the competitive model has 
some merit when one compares the coeffi- 
cients B1i to B2. The remaining results are 
attempts to summarize those aspects of the 
competitive and autarky models that are 
successful. The general theme is that con- 
vergence of the data over time, with replica- 
tion of the market, is in the general direc- 
tion of the competitive equilibria and that 
the autarky model is firmly rejected. In par- 
ticular, several qualitative features of the 
competitive model are very prominent in 
the data and are described by the next se- 
ries of results. 
Result 2 summarizes observations con- 
cerning whether or not the law of compara- 
tive advantage can be seen in operation. 
The notion is that countries export the out- 
put in whose production they have a com- 
parative advantage. Recall that when ap- 
plied to the parameters of environment 1, 
the law of comparative advantage holds that 
country 1 should specialize in and be a net 
exporter of good Y. Country 2 should spe- 
cialize in and be a net exporter of Z. 
RESULT 2: The law of comparative advan- 
tage accurately predicts trade patterns. 
SUPPORT: 
Refer to Tables 5, 6, and 7. Under the 
conditions of environment 1 (no tariff), nei- 
ther the net exports of Y nor the net im- 
ports of Z by country 1 are statistically 
different from the predictions of the com- 
petitive model of 18 units and 16 units, 
respectively. Thus, within this environment, 
the flow of international trade is not only in 
the direction predicted by the law of com- 
parative advantage, but the actual magni- 
tudes are converging to near those pre- 
dicted by the competitive model. Net 
exports of Y and net exports of Z are 14.4 
units and 16.1 units, respectively. Under the 
tariff condition, the directions of trade pat- 
terns are those predicted by the law, but 
exports of Z are significantly less than pre- 
dicted by the competitive model. That is, 
the net exports of Y by country 1 are 13.1 
units as opposed to the 18 predicted by the 
competitive model. Exports of Z by country 
2 are 1.4, as opposed to the 6 units pre- 
dicted by the competitive model. Under the 
conditions of environment 2 the net exports 
are not significantly different from those 
predicted by the competitive model (i.e., 3.7 
units net exports of Y by country 1, com- 
pared with the competitive equilibrium of 4; 
4.2 units of net exports of Z by country 2, 
compared with the 4 units predicted by the 
competitive model). In summary, under all 
conditions, the patterns of trade are consis- 
tent with the directions predicted by the law 
of comparative advantage. 
Implicit in the discussion above is the fact 
that the law of comparative advantage can 
be viewed as an independent principle or it 
can be viewed as a consequence following 
from the assumptions of the general com- 
petitive model. Thus, since the result lends 
support to the competitive model, it is natu- 
ral to inquire about other features of the 
model. The competitive model not only pre- 
dicts the direction of net exports, as cap- 
tured by the law of comparative advantage 
as discussed in Result 2, it also predicts 
patterns of production. For environment 1 
the competitive model predicts that no units 
of Y would be produced in country 1 and 
that no units of Z would be produced in 
country 2. Result 3 reflects considerations 
of those precise implications of the compet- 
itive model under both tariff and no-tariff 
conditions. 
The support for Result 3 can be seen in 
Figures 4 and 5 for environment 1. The 
figures contain world aggregate production 
for early periods and for later periods. The 
world production frontier is shown in the 
figure. The competitive model predicts that 
world production will be at the "kink" in 
the frontier. Figure 4 contains data from 
environment-1 experiments in which there 
were no tariffs. Figure 5 contains the data 
from environment-1 experiments in which 
tariffs existed. As can be seen in both 
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FIGURE 4. TOTAL SYSTEM PRODUCTION: ALL 
EXPERIMENTS, ENVIRONMENT 1, NO-TARIFF 
CONDITION 
of the figures, aggregate production is nearer 
the competitive equilibrium in the later 
periods. 
RESULT 3: Aggregate production patterns 
are conuerging toward those predicted by the 
competitive model under free trade. 
SUPPORT: 
As was mentioned at the beginning of this 
section, a weak definition of the phrase 
''converging toward" is that the data are 
either at (statistically) the competitive equi- 
libria at the end of the experiment or closer 
to the competitive equilibria at the end of 
the experiment than they were at the begin- 
ning. A stronger definition is that the data 
are converging to quantities that are not 
significantly different from the competitive- 
equilibrium predictions. As we stated in Re- 
sult 1, we reject the notion that the outcome 
variables are converging to the competitive 
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FIGURE 5. TOTAL SYSTEM PRODUCTION: ALL 
EXPERIMENTS, ENVIRONMENT 1, TARIFF 
CONDITION 
under the environment-1 (no-tariff) condi- 
tion Result 3 holds in the weak sense for 
most experiments and countries and varia- 
bles. In every case B2 is closer to the com- 
petitive equilibrium than all of the B1 's. 
The results under the conditions of environ- 
ment 1 (tariff) are not so uniformly suppor- 
tive of the result. For example, the produc- 
tion of Y1 is converging in only two of the 
three experiments for which coefficients B11 
and B13 equal 14 and 27, respectively, B2 is 
28, and the competitive equilibrium is 36 
units produced. In summary, for the tariff 
experiments, of the 12 cases (two countries, 
two commodities, and three experiments), 
only eight support the result. In environ- 
ment 2, the movement in nine of the 12 
cases is toward the competitive equilibrium. 
As for the autarky model, in environment 1, 
without tariffs, none of the 16 production 
levels is converging in the weak sense. Un- 
der tariffs, however, nine of the 12 variables 
converge to autarky in the weak sense. In 
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TABLE 8-DEVIATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS' HOLDING FROM COMPETITIVE-EQUILIBRIUM PREDICTIONS (BY PERIOD) 
Period 
Output Statistic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Y ,U -0.91 -0.46 -0.58 -0.45 -0.46 -0.40 -0.24 -0.18 -0.28 
Cr 1.63 1.49 1.29 1.38 1.09 1.11 0.91 0.98 1.05 
Z -0.95 - 0.79 -0.60 -0.40 - 0.30 -0.31 -0.21 -0.23 - 0.39 
1.84 1.64 1.15 1.55 1.25 1.26 1.06 1.07 1.16 
Notes: The statistics reported in the table were calculated as follows: 
" L(Xi- xi)/ 
where xi = actual holdings of agent i, ?i = competitive equilibrium holdings of agent i, and N = total number of 
observations (consumers times experiments). 
environment 2, 11 of the 12 variables are 
moving toward autarky. 
Result 3 is focused on production. The 
next result considers consumption patterns. 
Do individual consumption levels converge 
with replication of periods to the competi- 
tive-equilibrium model? For this result a 
different statistical model is chosen for 
convenience. For each individual in each 
experiment, the difference between actual 
consumption and the competitive equilib- 
rium is computed for each variable. These 
deviations are then pooled across all the 
experiments. 
RESULT 4: Individual consumption pat- 
terns are converging to those predicted by the 
competitive model. 
SUPPORT: 
The deviation in individual consumption 
from the quantities predicted in the compet- 
itive model are diminishing over time (see 
Table 8). In the table, the data are pooled 
for all of the experimental sessions. From 
the table, it is evident that the absolute 
values of the deviations are smaller in the 
later periods than in the earlier periods. For 
example, the mean deviations from the 
competitive equilibrium fall consistently 
over the first four periods for both Y and Z. 
Similarly, the standard deviations during the 
first periods are higher than those in the 
last periods. The hypothesis that the abso- 
lute value of the deviations for periods 1-3 
are smaller than or equal to those for peri- 
ods 7-11 can be rejected at p < 0.01. 
The addition of tariffs on imports of 
country 1 changes the predictions of the 
competitive model. According to the model, 
the tariff discourages the export of Z by 
country 2 and encourages the home con- 
sumption of Z by country 2. Figure 6 
demonstrates the differences in consump- 
tion patterns in environment 1 that were 
caused by the tariff. The figure shows aggre- 
gate consumption for each country, with the 
top panel containing data from country 1 
and the bottom panel containing data from 
country 2. The production-possibilities curve 
is shown for each country as a point of 
reference. Note that the consumption of Z 
is shifted from country 1 to country 2 with 
the imposition of the tariff. 
The change in consumption that is appar- 
ent in the figure reflects a deep interaction 
between principles of economics and the 
parameters of these economies. The tariff, 
400 francs per unit of Z imported by coun- 
try 1, is not so high as to prevent specializa- 
tion in both countries in the same levels of 
output as would occur under free trade 
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FIGURE 6. CONSUMPTION BY COUNTRY: 
ENVIRONMENT 1, ALL EXPERIMENTS, ALL 
PERIODS, TARIFF AND NO-TARIFF CONDITIONS 
according to the competitive model. That is, 
the world patterns of production should not 
be altered by the tariff in this version of the 
Ricardian model. However, the competitive 
model predicts that the reduction in exports 
of Z would lead to lower system efficiency.6 
The impact of the tariff is to block some 
gains from international exchange. System 
efficiency thus falls due to the imposition of 
a tariff. This property is captured by the 
110- 
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FIGURE 7. PREDICTED AND OBSERVED SYSTEM 
EFFICIENCIES: ENVIRONMENT 1, ALL 
EXPERIMENTS, ALL PERIODS, TARIFF 
AND NO-TARIFF CONDITIONS 
next result. Generally, we find that the tariff 
affects trade volume, efficiency, and prices 
in the way that the competitive model pre- 
dicts. 
RESULT 5: Tariffs reduce international 
trade and market efficiency, as predicted by 
the competitive model. Prices also differ in 
the manner predicted by the competitive 
model. 
SUPPORT: 
The relevant data are for environment 1. 
Average net exports per period are 10.3 
without the tariffs and 2.8 under tariffs. We 
reject the hypothesis at the p <0.01 level 
that exports of Z are lower or equal under 
free trade than under tariffs. Refer again to 
Figure 6, which depicts consumption in the 
two countries in all experiments in the con- 
dition of environment 1 with and without 
tariffs. Market efficiency under tariffs is 
compared to that without tariffs for the 
pooled environment-1 data in Figure 7. As 
can be seen for each period, average effi- 
ciency under the no-tariff condition is higher 
than average efficiency of the tariff condi- 
tion. We reject the hypothesis that effi- 
ciency is equal in the two conditions or 
6System efficiency is measured as actual social in- 
come (in francs) divided by social income at the com- 
petitive equilibrium under free trade. The tariff rev- 
enue is included as social income in our calculation of 
actual social income. See Plott and Smith (1978) for a 
discussion of this concept in a single-market economy. 
In a multiple-market economy the measure can be 
influenced by scale choices. 
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TABLE 9-THE EFFECTS OF TIME ON INPUT/OUTPUT PRICE RATIOS: ALL ENVIRONMENTS 
1 1 t-1 
Y=BIIDI-+ *--+B14D4-+B2 +u t t t 
Competitive equilibria Autarky 
Dependent Model Significance Model Significance 
Environment variable B11 B12 B13 B14 B2 predictions (p) predictions (p) p R2 
1 (NT) PLJ/PYJ 1.157 1.919 0.696 0.837 2.232 3 < 0.005 3 < 0.005 0.56 0.66 
(0.207) (0.388) (0.237) (0.184) (0.235) 
1 (NT) PL2/PZ2 0.947 0.616 0.865 1.141 1.383 2 < 0.005 2 < 0.005 0.54 0.69 
(0.243) (0.190) (0.197) (0.101) (0.114) 
1(T) PL /PY, 1.611 -0.058 1.300 - 2.090 3 < 0.025 3 < 0.025 0.62 0.66 
(0.334) (0.451) (0.448) - (0.432) 
1(T) PL2/PZ2 1.324 0.220 0.344 - 1.383 2 < 0.025 2 < 0.025 0.64 0.71 
(0.087) (0.305) (0.343) - (0.301) 
2 PL /Py, 0.711 0.571 0.763 - 0.873 1 < 0.005 1 < 0.005 0.25 0.49 
(0.060) (0.076) (0.048) - (0.028) 
2 PL2/PY2 0.731 0.815 0.863 - 0.884 1 < 0.005 1 < 0.005 0.28 0.17 
(0.057) (0.041) (0.176) - (0.041) 
2 PK1 /PZ1 0.640 0.662 0.561 - 0.868 1 < 0.005 1 < 0.005 0.34 0.52 
(0.045) (0.046) (0.040) - (0.036) 
2 PK2/PZ2 0.783 0.795 0.868 - 0.799 1 < 0.005 1 < 0.005 0.29 0.12 
(0.037) (0.086) (0.189) - (0.040) 
Note: For environment 1, NT denotes no tariffs, and T denotes tariffs. 
higher under tariffs (p < 0.05). We also re- 
ject the hypothesis, using the rank-sum test, 
that the prices of L2 or the prices of Z2 are 
equal under the tariff and in the absence of 
the tariff. The average prices of L2 and Z2 
are 550 and 467, respectively, under no-tariff 
conditions and are respectively 402 and 380 
under tariffs. As the competitive model pre- 
dicts, they are both lower in the tariff case. 
Result 5 can be viewed as a type of com- 
parative-static result, but the comparisons 
are not exactly like those that are studied in 
theory. In the theory of comparative statics, 
a comparison is made between the equilib- 
rium state before a tariff and the equilib- 
rium state after a tariff. The comparison 
made in Result 5 is between the disequilib- 
rium states as opposed to equilibrium states, 
with and without tariffs. The next results 
initiate an inquiry about the nature of this 
disequilibrium behavior. Result 6 is a state- 
ment about the behavior of output prices, 
the prices of Y and Z. 
RESULT 6: Output prices are converging 
(in the weak sense) toward the competitive 
equilibrium from above. 
SUPPORT: 
Reference to Tables 5, 6, and 7 reveals 
that, for environment 1 (no tariff) and envi- 
ronment 1 (tariff), both output prices are 
above the competitive equilibrium (as well 
as the autarky prediction) during the late 
periods of the experiment. This is true for 
both outputs. The convergence path is re- 
vealed by a comparison of Bli's and B2. In 
six of the eight possible cases under envi- 
ronment 1 (no tariff) and five of the six 
cases in environment 1 (tariff), the value of 
B1 's is above or equal to the value of B2 
and is not as close to the competitive equi- 
librium as is the value of B2. For environ- 
ment 2, prices are converging from above 
toward the competitive equilibrium in all 12 
of the possible cases. Thus, the prices in 
early periods tend to be above the late- 
period prices, and the direction of move- 
ment over time is toward the competitive- 
equilibrium price. 
While output prices move in a consistent 
way, as summarized by Result 6, input prices 
are more complex because of the nature of 
derived demand. The next result suggests 
that the deviation of factor prices from the 
competitive equilibrium is not only due to a 
lack of equilibrium in the output market 
prices, but factors have their own indepen- 
dent dynamic structure of adjustment. How- 
ever, the direction of adjustment in the fac- 
tor markets is toward the equilibria of the 
competitive model. 
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TABLE 10-CONVERGENCE PATTrERNS OF INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN FACTOR PRICES, ENVIRONMENT 2 
Competitive equilibria Autarky 
Dependent Model Model 
variable B1l B12 B13 B2 predictions Significance (p) predictions Significance (p) p R2 
PL1 PL2 10.44 -115.00 - 126.59 6.37 0 ns [-200, -1501 < 0.005 0.35 0.38 
(21.23) (42.10) (95.66) (19.50) 
PK1 PK2 -15.46 - 73.22 -23.62 12.92 0 ns [150,2001 < 0.005 0.32 0.27 
(37.93) (28.79) (78.13) (15.73) 
Note: Estimates were corrected for AR(1). 
RESULT 7: Factor prices are below 
marginal revenue products. That is, all of the 
input/output price ratios are below marginal 
products. The convergence is in the direction 
of the competitive-equilibrium relationship. 
SUPPORT: 
The condition for profit maximization un- 
der competitive conditions is simply that 
factor price equals marginal physical prod- 
uct times output price. Since production 
technologies are linear, the marginal physi- 
cal product is a constant. It follows that the 
ratio of factor price to output price, when 
compared to marginal products, can then be 
used to determine whether the input condi- 
tions are satisfied. 
Table 9 contains estimates of the time 
path of ratios of output prices to input 
prices. The econometric model is of the 
same form as described earlier. The Bl1 
variables measure the ratio during the first 
period, which is permitted to differ among 
experiments. The variable B2 measures the 
ratio as time goes to infinity. In 25 of the 26 
possible cases, the B1i's are less than B2, 
and B2 is less than the competitive equilib- 
rium. This indicates that, convergence to 
the competitive-equilibrium input/output 
price ratio, in the weak sense, is always 
present. 
Two reasonable explanations of the ob- 
served input/output price behaviors sum- 
marized in Result 7 are consistent with 
behaviors found in other experimental mar- 
kets. The first is that the asymmetry of rents 
received by sellers and buyers of the factors 
(sellers receive more rents) leads to lower 
transaction prices because rents are split 
(see Smith and Arlington W. Williams, 
1982). However, if this is the explanation, 
then the factor prices should approach equi- 
librium from below. In all environments, as 
long as output prices are at or above the 
competitive-equilibria prices, producer sur- 
plus is greater than consumer surplus in the 
appropriate partial-equilibrium model. As is 
evident in Table 6, factor prices in environ- 
ment 2 do not approach the competitive 
equilibria from below. 
Since factor prices do not approach equi- 
libria from below in environment 2, this first 
(rent-splitting) explanation must be re- 
jected. The other possible explanation is 
that the buyers of the factors face a market 
risk. The buyer may not be able to sell the 
final goods produced with the factor. In the 
experiments, producers must buy the input, 
then produce and sell the output. This takes 
time, and the possibilities that prices could 
change or that time could run out create 
real risks for producers. As a compensation 
to the producer for bearing this risk, a "re- 
turn for risk-bearing," the factor/output 
price ratio starts low and adjusts upward. 
Risk of this type might be a general prop- 
erty of interdependent markets, and if it is, 
then the input/output price adjustments 
observed in the experiments might also be 
observed in the field. Regardless of the in- 
teresting separate dynamics, the most fun- 
damental theoretical property derived from 
the competitive-equilibrium model still 
holds, as is captured by Result 8. 
RESULT 8: Factor prices adjust across 
countries (in environment 2) as predicted by 
the factor-price-equalization principle. 
SUPPORT: 
In environment 2, competitive-equi- 
librium output prices are all the same 
(200-250), and competitive equilibrium in- 
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TABLE 11-CONVERGENCE PATrERNS OF PRODUCER PROFITS OVER TIME: ALL ENVIRONMENTS 
1 1 t-1 
y=B11D1- + +B14D4-+B2 +u 
t t t 
Competitive equilibria Autarky 
Model Model 
Environment B1l B12 B13 B14 B2 predictions Significance (p) predictions Significance (p) p R2 
1 (NT) 7,479 6,93 24,200 13,778 5,798 0 < 0.005 0 < 0.005 0.54 0.82 
(817) (2,953) (1,935) (879) (1,381) 
1 (T) 5,300 35,336 12,699 - 1985 0 <0.005 0 <0.005 0.07 0.87 
(875) (3,713) (2,550) (648) 
2 3,730 3,085 3,179 - 1271 0 < 0.005 0 < 0.005 0.20 0.47 
(378) (868) (1,128) (188) 
Notes: For environment 1, NT denotes no tariffs, and T denotes tariffs. Estimates were corrected for AR(1). 
put prices are all the same (200-225). A 
natural test is, thus, whether or not the 
difference between the factor prices in the 
two countries is zero. Table 10 contains the 
estimates which show that, for both input 
factors, the hypothesis that the prices are 
equal as t gets large cannot be rejected. 
The equality of factor prices for our pa- 
rameters in environment 2 is a theoretically 
sound result. Since the outputs trade inter- 
nationally they must trade at the same price 
in the two countries. Therefore, because 
production technology is linear and identi- 
cal in the two countries, the marginal rev- 
enue product of the inputs and therefore 
their wages should be the same even though 
the inputs themselves do not trade interna- 
tionally. Interestingly, in our experiment, we 
observe equality of input prices across coun- 
tries even though these input prices are not 
equal to the marginal revenue product of 
the inputs. 
Since profits can be viewed as a return to 
a special input (risk-bearing), the pattern of 
profits is worthy of special investigation. In 
the competitive model, equilibrium profits 
from production are zero. The next result 
demonstrates that the patterns of profits 
follow the laws suggested by the competitive 
model. 
RESULT 9: Profits from production are 
positive but fall over time. 
SUPPORT: 
Table 11 contains estimates of the time 
path of profits. As can be seen the Bli 
terms in every experiment are greater than 
the B2 term. Furthermore, B2 is signifi- 
cantly greater than zero. Since the B1i terms 
measure initial profits and the B2 term 
measures profits as time goes to infinity, the 
conclusion is obtained. Profits are higher at 
the beginning than later, and profits are 
positive. 
Finally, we make three observations. The 
first is a summary about the autarky model 
which is included for completeness. Obser- 
vations 2 and 3 are different. Neither obser- 
vation has particular foundation in theory. 
However, following the statement of the 
observations, we provide a conjecture about 
the nature of the dynamics at work in these 
markets. If the conjecture is correct, then 
the third observation can be explained. 
OBSERVATION 1: The competitive model 
explains the data better than does the autarky 
model. 
SUPPORT: 
The support is contained in previously 
stated results. In Results 2 and 3 the pro- 
duction data from environment 1 reveal that 
the systems of production and export for all 
goods are moving toward the competitive 
equilibrium and away from autarky. The 
production data from environment 2 seem 
to favor neither model. From Result 5, we 
see that tariffs had effects predicted by the 
competitive model, while autarky predicted 
that tariffs would have no effects. From 
Result 6 we find that output prices are 
converging to the competitive equilibrium, 
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FIGURE 8. TOTAL SYSTEM PRODUCTION: ALL 
EXPERIMENTS, ENVIRONMENT-1 TARIFF VERSUS 
NO-TARIFF CONDITIONS, PERIOD 6 AND AFFTER 
as opposed to the autarky levels. The only 
input prices that move toward autarky and 
away from the competitive equilibrium are 
those for L2 under the tariff condition. 
OBSERVATION 2: In the no-tarif condi- 
tion, a large amount of exporting going back 
and forth between the two countries was ob- 
served. The trading appeared to be intemaa- 
tional speculation and seemed to help mar- 
kets converge. 
SUPPORT: 
Net exports constitute only 63.8 percent 
of total international trade under free trade 
in environment 1. The rest of the volume 
comprised units which had been or were 
being returned to their country of origin. 
When tariffs were imposed, the cross trad- 
ing in Z was essentially eliminated. 
OBSERVATION 3: Contrary to the predic- 
tion of the competitive model, the tariff re- 
duced production efficiency. 
SUPPORT: 
Figure 8 contains world production data 
for the last few periods of experiments with 
tariffs and experiments without tariffs. These 
are periods after which some equilibration 
has taken place. Recall that in this version 
of the Ricardian model the tariff should 
have no influence on production. As is clear 
from the figure, production was less when 
the tariff existed. 
Observation 3 indicates that the tariffs 
have costs beyond those predicted by the 
static competitive model. A review of some 
of the results presented above provides sur- 
prisingly strong support for a conjecture 
about the nature of the dynamics at work in 
these markets. Collecting Results 6, 7, 8, 
and 9, along with Observation 3, reveals a 
pattern of the disequilibrium dynamics. The 
system appears to be moving toward the 
competitive equilibria along a qualitatively 
distinctive path. The term "conjecture" is 
used because the path cannot be deduced 
from accepted theory, even though it is sup- 
ported by much theoretical intuition. 
An explanation of the dynamics, which 
we shall call the "risk-compensated input/ 
output price-adjustment process," begins 
with the observation that markets have an 
inherent randomness as part of the general 
equilibration process. This randomness cre- 
ates a risk for producers who must commit 
to the purchase of resources and who face 
the possibility of losses if the product pro- 
duced from the resources cannot be sold at 
sufficiently high prices. Accordingly, pro- 
ducers restrict purchase of resources and 
thus restrict production as they gather in- 
formation about market conditions. The re- 
sults are higher (than equilibrium) market 
prices in output markets due to restricted 
supplies and lower (than equilibrium) input 
prices due to restricted input demand. As 
the experience that producers gain from the 
market advances with the repetition and 
stationarity of parameters, the uncertainty 
diminishes (due to the accumulation of in- 
formation about the market) and the ran- 
domness decreases (due to equilibration). 
Output expands, output prices fall, and in- 
put prices rise. The results are an increasing 
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input/output price ratio over time and 
falling profits. The conjecture that follows is 
simply that disequilibrium behavior is char- 
acterized by such a process. 
CONJECTURE: Equilibration in the experi- 
ments follows the risk-compensated input/ 
output price-adjustment process. 
SUPPORT: 
All of the properties of the path, as de- 
scribed, are contained in the market data. 
Output prices converge toward the competi- 
tive equilibrium from above (Result 6). In- 
put prices converge toward the competitive 
equilibrium (Results 7 and 8). Finally, pro- 
ducers' profits fall over time (Result 9) as 
the input/output price ratio increases. 
The fact that input prices converge to the 
competitive equilibrium from below in envi- 
ronment 1 and converge from above in envi- 
ronment 2 is also consistent with the hy- 
pothesis. In environment 1 producers faced 
greater risks than in environment 2. In envi- 
ronment 2 producers were also consumers 
of factors, so factors unused in production 
were valuable to them as consumption. In 
environment 1 producers had no such alter- 
natives, so the "down side" losses to pro- 
ducers were greater in environment 1 than 
in environment 2. The greater risk to pro- 
ducers in environment 1 would then be 
manifest in lower input prices. 
Observation 3 is also consistent with the 
hypothesis that the disequilibrium is charac- 
terized by such a path. A tariff imposed on 
the imports of Z in country 1 (which has a 
comparative disadvantage in Z and thus 
consumes only imported Z in equilibrium) 
constitutes a major perturbation of the sys- 
tem. The natural tendency is for the price 
of Z in country 1 to be higher as a result of 
the tariffs. The risk-compensated input/ 
output price-adjustment process exacer- 
bates the increase of the price of Z in 
country 1 in the early period of an experi- 
ment. With the price of imported Z very 
high in country 1 due to the combined ef- 
fects, some Z gets produced in country 1. 
On the other hand, in country 2, market 
demand for Z is reduced because there is 
reduced demand for exports. Thus, in coun- 
try 2 the price of Z falls, making Z less 
profitable for country-2 producers relative 
to the production of Y, whose market sup- 
ply is reduced because some of the re- 
sources in country 1 are diverted to the 
production of Z. Some Y gets produced in 
country 2. Thus, along this disequilibrium 
path, country 1 (inefficiently) shifts produc- 
tion from a full specialization in the produc- 
tion of Y to include the production of some 
Z. Country 2 shifts from a complete special- 
ization in the production of Z to include 
(inefficiently) the production of some Y. 
The resulting inefficiencies are captured in 
the data from the experiments as summa- 
rized by Observation 3 and are shown in 
Figure 8. 
Of course, there is nothing theoretically 
new about profits being a return to produc- 
ers for bearing market uncertainty. The new 
and difficult (theoretical) challenge stems 
from the fact that markets seem to have a 
natural but inexplicable random component 
that is not captured by modern theory. The 
intuition that should support a theory seems 
clear, but no formal statement of such a 
theory currently exists. The natural reaction 
of agents to the inherent randomness would 
seem to be similar for any portfolio adjust- 
ment. The system adjustment to the individ- 
ual hedging behavior appears natural 
enough. Since the path has such clearly 
distinguishable features, it will be of inter- 
est to explore other experiments as well as 
field data to see whether system adjust- 
ments, along the risk-compensated input/ 
output price path, is found in other places 
as well. It will also be of interest to learn 
whether the intuition captured by the expla- 
nation given above can be placed on solid 
theoretical footing. 
VI. Conclusion 
The main result of the paper is that we 
observe experimentally for the first time that 
the law of comparative advantage predicts 
patterns of trade and output. This result 
would not have been completely unantici- 
pated by trade theorists, because it is so 
embedded in modern economic models. 
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However, the experiments, like naturally oc- 
curring economies, are complex, with mis- 
takes, trading out of equilibrium, limitations 
on information, considerable uncertainty 
about the future, and other prominent fea- 
tures that are not present in existing stylized 
models. Furthermore, the recent debates on 
U.S. competitiveness suggest that many 
people outside the economics research com- 
munity do not believe that the law of com- 
parative advantage works and are prepared 
to base policy on much different principles 
of system behavior. We find it remarkable 
that this fundamental principle operates 
with such strength and robustness even 
though the competitive model is statistically 
rejected. Were it not found operating, we 
would be forced to reexamine one of the 
deepest aspects of modern theories of the 
nature of trade, and the existence of that 
very real possibility was an important con- 
sideration in the research design. 
While there are many positive ways to 
look at these data, there is one fundamental 
fact that must not be overlooked. The com- 
petitive model is rejected. Considerable 
variation in these data remains to be ex- 
plained. The quantitative predictions do not 
work so well. 
Generally, the qualitative predictions of 
the competitive model are upheld. Conver- 
gence processes are present, so the compet- 
itive model receives better support in the 
later periods after equilibration takes place. 
This convergence takes place more quickly 
and strongly for quantitiqs than for prices. 
The support of the competitive model ex- 
tends itself to the qualitative impacts of a 
tariff. Support of this nature is very interest- 
ing since comparative-statics models gener- 
ally assume that the system is moving from 
one established equilibrium to another. In 
real markets, such as those studied here, 
disequilibria exist. There is little support for 
the autarky model in these experiments. 
International trade occurs in a natural way 
and must be considered in the application 
of models to any of the interacting coun- 
tries. 
Factor-price equalization is a remarkable 
and unintuitive property. While this prop- 
erty is characteristic of only specialized en- 
vironments, it is important in helping us to 
see and understand that the principles of 
economics can lead to unintuitive results. 
That wages should equalize as a result of 
competition in output markets alone is such 
a proposition. Under the strong conditions 
in which theory suggests it will exist, we 
actually found it. 
Although it was diminishing over time, 
there was a universal tendency for the fac- 
tors of production to trade at prices below 
their marginal revenue product. The most 
plausible explanation is that the output 
prices adjusted upward and the input prices 
adjusted downward to compensate produc- 
ers for the risk they undertook in producing 
the output. In later market periods, as out- 
put prices stabilized and the natural ran- 
domness that exists in markets tended to 
diminish, the producers' risk declined, input 
prices increased, output prices decreased, 
and producer profits fell. The process is 
well described by the term "risk-com- 
pensated input/ output price-adjustment 
process." This somewhat surprising pattern 
is so plausible in retrospect that it leads to a 
conjecture about whether it may be a gen- 
eral property of production economies ob- 
servable in the field, especially those with 
extreme output-price uncertainty, such as 
centrally planned systems in transition to 
market economies. 
APPENDIX 
Several different instructions were used 
during the course of these experiments. En- 
vironments 1 and 2 differed because pro- 
ducers had redemption values for input 
goods in environment 2 but not in environ- 
ment 1. There were also two input goods in 
environment 2 and only one input good in 
environment 1. The experiments with eight 
subjects had instructions that differed 
slightly from those with 16 subjects. In the 
16-subject experiments, a distinction was 
made between agent "type" (type 1 or type 
2), while no such distinction was made be- 
tween agents in the eight-person experi- 
ments because the activities (producer and 
consumer) were combined. Then, there were 
the experiments in which an import tax 
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TABLE Al -LABELS OF OUTPUT AND INPUT AcTIVITIES 
BY SOURCE: PAPER, INSTRUCTIONS, DATA SETS 
(MARKETS) 
Environment Paper Instructions Data (market) 
1 L W v 1 
L2 X 2 
Y, Y, 3 
Y2 Y2 4 
Z1 Z5 S 
Z2 Z2 6 
2 L, WI 1 
L2 W2 2 
K, Y, 3 
K2 Y2 4 
Y, Xl S 
Y2 X2 6 
Z, Z, 7 
Z2 Z2 8 
existed. In reviewing the material that fol- 
lows, the reader should appreciate that each 
of these several instructions was generated 
by only a few word changes (e.g., "'and/or"' 
vs. "or"). A single paragraph added to the 
instructions explained the tariff in those ex- 
periments in which a tariff was operative. 
The instructions hold two additional 
sources of potential ambiguity. The first is 
the labeling of markets. Three sets of labels 
exist throughout the series. For example, in 
the text of this paper the input from country 
1 is labeled as L . However, in the instruc- 
tions read to subjects, this input was called 
W, and the trading activity of W took place 
in market 1 and is recorded that way in the 
data sets. Table Al lists all of the relation- 
ships. The word "paper" refers to the 
manuscript version of the text preceding 
this appendix; the word "instructions" refers 
to what subjects saw; and "data/markets" 
indicates the index as presented on com- 
puter screens during the experiment and in 
the data sets. 
The second source of possible confusion 
is the assignment of subjects to agent types, 
such as consumer/producer. In 16-person 
experiments there is no confusion. Subjects 
in country i control resources and/or con- 
sume and/or produce in country i. In the 
eight-person sessions, the roles were dif- 
ferent. The lack of subject numbers re- 
quired functions of producer, consumer, and 
resource owner to be combined. Because of 
the small numbers, an oligopoly problem 
presented itself. If the producers own re- 
sources in their own country, then they could 
influence the activities of their competition 
by refusing to sell him/her the resources. 
In order to avoid this complicating factor, 
firms were producers/consumers in one 
country but owned resources in the other 
country. Thus, producers/consumers in 
country i were resource owners in country 
j. Of course resource owners still could not 
transport the resources from one country to 
another. 
The set of instructions that follows is for 
the 16-person environment-1 experiments. 
The forms for the redemption value sheets 
(for consumption decisions) were the same 
for all treatments, as were the accounting 
forms. Blank examples of both are included 
at the end of the instructions. Of course, 
the redemption value sheets are filled in by 
the experimenter and the accounting sheets 
by the subject. 
General Instructions [Exact Transcript] 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision-making. The instructions are simple, and if you follow 
them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you 
in cash. 
In this experiment, we are going to conduct a market in which you will be designated as one of two types of 
traders in a sequence of trading periods (either a type 1 or a type 2). Find your type at the top of the instructions. In 
your folder you have a sheet entitled Record Sheet. If you are a type 1, you will also have a Redemption Value 
Sheet. If you are a type 2 you will have a Production Schedule. These sheets will help you determine the value to 
you of any decisions that you might make. YOU ARE NOT TO REVEAL THE INFORMATION ON THESE 
SHEETS TO ANYONE. They are your own private information. 
The currency used in this market is francs. All trading will be in terms of francs. Your final payoff will be in 
terms of dollars. The conversion rate is francs to 1 U.S. dollar. You will be paid at the end 
of the experiment. 
There are four types of goods which can be traded in our market: W, X, Y, and Z. You may make profits in two 
ways, through consumption and through trading of the four goods. 
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Production Schedule 
(Each Period) 
____________ Identification No: 
Units of X 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
(Input) 
Unit Output 0 5 3 1 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 
(Y) 
Total Output 0 5 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
(Y) 
Units of X 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
(Input) 
Unit Output 0 5 3 1 0 0 0 000 0 0 0 
(Z) 
Total Output 0 5 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
(Z) 
Specific Instructions to Type-i Traders [Exact Transcript] 
CONSUMPTION 
During each period you are free to purchase and sell as many units of W, X, Y and Z as you might want. Any 
units that you hold in your inventory at the end of the period are considered to be consumed by you. For the first 
unit of Y that you consume during a trading period you will receive the amount listed on your Redemption Value 
Sheet the column labelled Y Unit Value in the 1st row. If you consume a second unit you receive the amount listed 
in the column labelled Y Unit Value in the second row. The total amount that you receive from the consumption of 
both units is found in the column labelled Y Total Value in the second row. Notice that if you have unit values of 
zero in a space or a column that the corresponding units are worthless to you. The amount you receive from 
consumption of Z is found in exactly the same way: The redemption value received from consumption of W and X 
is always zero. 
Specific Instructions to Type-2 Traders [Exact Transcript] 
PRODUCTION 
During each market period type two traders are free to produce units of Y and Z from units of W and X. This is 
done with the Transformation Key (F4). When producing units of Y and/or Z from units of W and X use the table 
labelled Production Schedule. This table reflects the number of units of Y and/or Z that you can produce from 
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REDEMPTION VALUE SHEET 
(For Consumption Decisions) 
Unit W unit W total X unit X total Y unit Y total Z unit Z total 








given amounts of W and X for the whole period. You have already been instructed in how to read the production 
schedule, but the following hypothetical example may provide further clarification. 
Example: Suppose that you have 2 units of X and you have the Production Schedule shown on the next page 
[previous page in this appendix]. You can produce either: 
a) 8 units of Y 
b) 5 units of Y and 5 units of Z 
c) 8 units of Z 
Instructions to Both Types [Exact Transcript] 
TRADING PROFITS 
Another source of profits is from buying and selling the four types of goods. Selling increases your cash on hand 
by the amount of the sale price. Buying reduces your cash on hand by the amount of the purchase. Thus you can 
either gain or lose money on the purchase and resale of units. 
EARNINGS 
Your profits each period are computed by taking the redemption values of the units of W, X, Y, and Z that you 
consumed that period, adding the total sale price of the units of that you sold during the period and then 
subtracting the total of the prices you paid for the units that you bought during the period. The profits that you 
make exactly equal the change in your cash on hand from the beginning to the end of the period plus the 
redemption values of the units you consume. 
At the end of the period enter the total number of units that you consume of W, X, Y, and Z at the top of your 
Record Sheet. Then, fill out the rest of your record sheet as follows. In line 2, fill in your Cash on Hand at the 
beginning of the period. In line 1, fill in your cash on hand at the end of the period. In line 3 fill in line 1 minus line 
2. In lines 4-7 fill in your earnings from the consumption of W, X, Y, and Z. In line 8 add the total of lines 4-7. In 
line 9 add the total of lines 3 and 8. This amount is equal to your profits for the period (in francs). 
ENDOWMENTS 
1) At the beginning of each period you will be given an endowment of either W or X. This endowment will 
appear in your inventory and will remain the same every period. You are free to sell any part of this endowment to 
anyone who might want to buy it. 
2) At the beginning of the experiment you will receive 100000 francs cash on hand. 
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Record Sheet 
Period = 1 
W X Y = 
(1) Cash on hand at end of period 
(2) Cash on hand at beginning of period 
(3) Net change in cash on hand (l)-(2) 





(8) Total earnings from consumption (4)+(5)+(6)+(7) 
(9) TOTAL PROFITS FOR THE PERIOD 
HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS 
Type 1 people are endowed with W or X but would like to consume Y and Z. They can sell W or X to type 2 
people to increase their cash in order to buy Y and Z. Type 2 people are endowed with W or X but may purchase 
additional units from type 1 people. They can produce Y and Z from W or X and sell them to type 1 people to 
increase their cash. 
MARKET RESTRICTIONS 
Some of you may not be able to trade in all markets. You may not trade in markets 
Unless you are informed otherwise these markets will be closed to you for the entire experiment. 
You may be taxed for trading in market 6. The tax that you pay is francs for each unit 
that you buy or sell in that market. Unless you are informed otherwise, the tax will remain the same for the entire 
experiment. 
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